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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT
JURISDICTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR CIVIL
DISABILITIES: THE POST-CUSTODY PETITION
Post-Conviction review has becone an established part of'the criminal
process. This development, which has occurred during the last few .years,
is a by-product of the changes in criteria governing criminal prosecutions
wrought by the Suprene Court of the United States and, to a
considerable extent, br liberal state courts. As new mininntunt standards
have been recognized, pressures have developed ]br broader and more
efficient systems of post-conviction remedies to deal with the
transitional, and with the Itore lasting, ranifications of the changes.
AdvisorY Committee on Sentencing and Review, A BA Project on
Mininuin Standards ]br Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-
Conviction Renedies I (Tent. Draft 1967).
A basic anachronism in the development of post-conviction remedies
has been the erratic adherence to the jurisdictional prerequisite of
"custody" or "incarceration." 1 The federal courts and a few state
courts and legislatures, recognizing that the legal consequences of an
unconstitutional conviction do not terminate with release of individuals
from custody,2 have permitted attacks on prior convictions after release
from imprisonment. Rather than adhere to the incarceration
requirement, these courts require that the petitioner demonstrate that
he is under some form of civil disability resulting from the challenged
conviction. Noting that the vast majority of states continue to grant
post-conviction relief only to incarcerated petitioners, the American
Bar Association in 1967 proposed the repeal of the custody
prerequisite.3 The state legislative response to that proposal has been
less than overwhelming. The Supreme Court has yet to respond to this
legislative inertia by holding that any form of post-conviction or post-
custody relief from prior unconstitutional convictions is required on the
1. Compare Peyton v. Rowe, 390 U.S. 54 (1968) and Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th
Cir. 1962), revd 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) now contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. IV 1969)), with People v. Davis, 39 I11. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968)
(interpreting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969)).
2. See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 390 U.S. 54 (1968); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502
(1954); State v. Huffman, 207 Ore. 372, 297 P.2d 831 (1956).
3. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEw-ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES §§ 2.3, 2.4 (Tent. Draft 1967).
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state level. Nonetheless, in a line of decisions starting with United
States v. Morgan' and culminating with Sibron v. New York,5 the
Supreme Court's recognition of civil disabilities as an independent
jurisdictional basis for collateral attacks of prior convictions represents
a strong foundation for the logical implication of a due process
requirement. Moreover, recent decisions under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Acts suggest that the doctrines in the Morgan-Sibron evolution
will also be read by the federal courts to permit construction of a
federal remedy for the state post-custody petitioner.
The purpose of this Note is to consider the Morgan-Sibron
development of civil disabilities, as contrasted with "custody," into an
independent jurisdictional basis for both state and federal post-
conviction relief.
I, UNITED STATES V. MORGAN: THE RECOGNITION
The development of independent significance for civil disabilities in
the post-conviction context began with St. Pierre v. United States.7
There, the petitioner, appealing from a federal criminal contempt
conviction, was released from custody before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. After certiorari was granted, the government argued
that the petitioner's constitutional claims were rendered moot by his
release. The Court agreed, holding that there was ". . . no longer a
subject matter . . .on which [the Court's] .. .judgment could
operate.", It added, however, that the petitioner had not shown that
he was under either penalties or disabilities which applied to him after
the satisfaction of the judgment. As will be seen in Pollard v. United
State.s, subsequent courts have employed this caveat to circumvent
entirely the custody requirement of St. Pierre.
In United States v. Morgan,10 following a prior federal conviction
which was allegedly unconstitutional, the petitioner received an
increased sentence in New York courts under the state's recidivist
statute. The petition, labeled an application for a writ of coram nobis,
was filed in the United States district court which originally convicted
4 346 U S 502 (954).
5 392 U S. 40 (1968),
6. 42 U SC. 1983 (1964).
7 319 U.S 41 (1942).
8. St Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41,42 (1942).
9. 352 U.S 354 (1957).
10 346 U.S. 502 1954).
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him. The district court treated the application as a motion under
section 2255,11 the federal post-conviction statute, and denied relief
because the petitioner was no longer in custody under a federal
sentence. Reversing, the court of appeals held that section 2255 did not
destroy the common law writ of coram nobis. Since traditionally
coram nobis did not require custody, the district court had improperly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme C6urt affirmed the
court of appeals, holding that a writ in the nature of coram nobis was
the appropriate remedy. The court stated broadly that the remedy was
appropriate because:
Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may
persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights
may be affected. As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, we
think, respondent is entitled to show that this conviction was invalid."2
The Morgan decision could be read as holding only that a longer
state sentence is a necessary condition precedent to federal relief in the
absence of federal custody. The language of that decision, however, can
be read to permit challenge whenever inequities of a longer state
detention or civil disabilities flowing from the challenged conviction are
shown. The implication would seem to be that whenever any legal
disabilities are imposed based on a prior unconstitutional conviction,
that conviction should be open to attack.
Subsequent appellate decisions, although less explicit in their
rationale, confirm that civil disabilities, in no way equivalent to
incarceration, will nonetheless support a coram nobis collateral attack
of federal convictions." For example, in United States v. Cariola,t4 the
petitioner was permitted to challenge via coram nobis a conviction
under the Mann Act entered and served 24 years earlier. The
jurisidiction of the court to entertain the challenge was based solely on
the still existing legal restrictions on the petitioner's right to vote.
Morgan, and the line of decisions following it, are incomplete in their
analysis of the jurisdictional elements they require. 15 Nor do those
II. Id. at 504.
12. Id. at 512-13.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963); Kyle v. United States,
288 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1961); Government of Virgin Islands v. Ferrei, 275 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1960),
14. 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 278 F. Supp. 626 (D. Hawaii 1968). The court states:
"Petitioner's choice of remedy, coram nobis, is proper, for under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) coram
nobis lies to correct errors of the most fundamental character where the defendant has completed
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decisions suggest why civil or criminal legal consequences are
equivalent to custody, or why, if not equivalents, these disabilities merit
federal relief. The landmark decision in Fay. v. Noiall made it clear
that in habeas corpus applications, it is the unconstitutionality of the
detention rather than the unconstitutionality of the conviction which
confers on federal courts jurisdiction over the prior judgment.
Assuming that there is some consistency in the rationale of federal
post-conviction review, Morgan would apparently hold that any legal
consequences, including incarceration, which are the direct result of an
unconstitutional conviction, are themselves unconstitutional.17 As will
be discussed later, this holding does not necessarily mean that the states
must provide collateral relief from those unconstitutional burdens."
The Morgan line of cases, supporting federal jurisdiction for
collateral attack solely on civil disabilities, must be carefully
distinguished from Pollard v. United States.9 There, the Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction in habeas corpus, once attached, is not
divested by a subsequent release from custody of the petitioner. In
Pollard, the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had
been twice put in jeopardy for the same crime, was denied both in the
district court and the court of appeals. Following a grant of certiorari
by the Supreme Court, the petitioner was released. The Court rejected
the government's argument that the case was moot following the
release. It held that the "'possibility of consequences collateral to the
imposition of the sentence" was sufficient to sustain the already
acquired jurisdiction. The Court recently reaffirmed the Pollard
holding in Sibron v. New York2" stating that, "The Court thus
acknowledged [in Pollard] the obvious fact of life that most criminal
convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. The
mere 'possibility' that this will be the case is enough to preserve a
criminal case from ending 'ignominiously in the limbo of
mootness' . ",21
his sentence or is otherwise not in custody and where circumstances compel such action to achieve
justice " ld at 630. See also Deckard v. United States, 381 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1967); McDonald
v United States, 356 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966); Azzone v. United
States, 341 F.2d 417 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965); Scarponi v. United States,
313 F 2d 950 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Roth, 283 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. 372 U S 391,423 (1963).
17 See- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964) ("He is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .... .
18 See text accompanying note 22, nfra.
19 352 U S. 354 (1957).
20. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
21 Id at 55.
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II. SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A PROPOSED
APPLICATION
The net result of the Morgan-Cariola-Pollard decisions is to
guarantee that release from custody will not forfeit a defendant's right
to attack an unconstitutional federal conviction. To reach this position,
the Court in a series of steps has indicated (1) that civil consequences
of an unconstitutional conviction are themselves unconstitutionally
imposed, and (2) that it is not adverse to expansion of remedies other
than habeas corpus to permit collateral attacks on unconstitutional
convictions. The question remains, of course, whether the federal
guarantee of post-conviction relief without regard to custody is
dependent on the federal nature of the convictions before the Court or
has developed under the more pervasive mandates of the due process
clause.
In Case v. Nebraska,2 the petitioner argued that the state was
required under the due process clause to provide some form of post-
conviction remedy. The Supreme Court did not respond to the due
process argument, however, because the Nebraska legislature enacted
a post-conviction act before the Supreme Court rendered a decision.
The case was therefore remanded to the Nebraska Supreme Court to
discover whether the petitioner was afforded relief under that act.
It may be that the Court will never be faced with the question of
constitutionally required state post-custody relief. The 1967 tentative
draft proposals of the ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction
Remedies expressly eliminate custody as a jurisdictional prerequisite to
post-conviction relief when the petitioner is under a civil disability
resulting from the challenged conviction.13 Moreover, a few far-sighted
state supreme courts have eliminated custody as a requirement for their
state's statutory post-conviction remedies. 4 Finally, the Court may rely
on alternative federal remedies.
As pointed out earlier, the development of civil disabilities as an
independent jurisdictional basis, distinct from custody, is logically
premised on the rationale that those civil disabilities flowing from an
unconstitutional conviction are in themselves unconstitutional. While it
remains open to question whether this development of federal
guarantees for post-custody collateral attack will be incorporated into
22. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
23. See note 3, supra:
24. See People v. Davis, 39 1l.2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
POST-CUSTODY PETITION
the fourteenth amendment, it has been read recently to authorize
expansion of federal relief to state petitioners under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.5
No custody is necessary to maintain a 1983 action, and Sibron makes
it clear that so long as civil disabilities attach to conviction, the
question of their constitutionality is not moot. 6
The civil disabilities attached to an unconstitutional state court
conviction prevent a petitioner from exercising various civil rights. The
deprivation is based on actions taken under color of state law, or is
caused by the state's refusal to grant a remedy. Under these
circumstances, the petitioner falls squarely under the language of
section 1983.
The cases state that section 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the
requirements of federal habeas corpus." But it is apparent that a post-
custody petitioner asserting a remedy under section 1983 for relief from
an unconstitutional state conviction is claiming relief not available
under the habeas corpus statute. In situations in which there is no
custody, and in which the petitioners have a reasonable defense to an
allegation of laches, the habeas corpus statute has no relevance.
Moreover, deprivation of civil rights following an unconstitutional
conviction has been given independent significance. Therefore, absence
of federal post-custody relief under the habeas corpus statute would not
seem to destroy section 1983 as an alternative device for relief.
This is apparently the approach followed by the district court in
Pales De Mendes v. Aponte.2 1 A school teacher was convicted for
25 42 I SC. , 1983 (1964).
26 Sibron v. New York, 392 U S. 40, 50-52 (1968).
27 Johnon v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. New York, 281 F. Supp.
579, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Christman v. Pennsylvania, 272 F. Supp. 805, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1967);
Davis %. Maryland. 248 F. Supp. 951,952 (D. Md. 1965).
28 294 1. Supp. 311 (D.P.R. 1969). See also Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290
V Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968) and Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo.
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disturbing the peace. Because of a curious jurisdictional problem, no
appeal to the Supreme Court lay for her conviction. She was fined and
brought action to enjoin the collection of the fine and to expunge the
record of her conviction. The fine was paid before the case was heard,
rendering the first requested relief moot. The court, however, sustained
jurisdiction over the second prayer for relief reasoning that since the
conviction "entails ill collateral effects on her good name and
reputation in that the extant record of the criminal judgment would be
an indelible blemish on her reputation and good name as a member of
the teaching profession and of society at large."2 Citing Sibron and
Morgan, the court ordered the conviction removed under section 1983.
If Section 1983 is developed as a device for post-custody relief for
state petitioners unjustly burdened with civil disabilities, it may well
reflect a reluctance on the part of the federal courts to impose inflexible
procedures of review on the states which will undeniably interfere with
the states' independent administration of post-conviction remedies."
Moreover, the Supreme Court. in Kaufman v. United States3' has
apparently expressed a preference for federal review in the context of
constitutional challenges. In Kaufman, the Court pointed out that one
of the reasons for the imposition of federal habeas corpus on the states
was to give a petitioner alleging denial of constitutional rights an
opportunity to be heard in a federal forum.3 2 This opportunity for
presumably more sympathetic federal review can be crucial in
unconstitutional short-sentence convictions stemming from local
prejudices toward the race or political views of the defendant. The
Court in Sibron clearly expressed its concern in this area of "low
visibility" criminal administration:
Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered
primarily at a level of "low visibility" in the criminal process-in the
context of prosecutions for "minor" offenses which carry only short
sentences. . . . We do not believe that the Constitution contemplates
that people deprived of constitutional rights at this level should be left
utterly remediless and defenseless against repetitions of unconstitutional
conduct. '3
1968) allowing a § 1983 challenge to determinations made by a school disciplinary committee,
despite the fact that the student had been readmitted. The action was justified on the basis of the
stigma attached to the disciplinary board's "conviction."
29. Pales De Mendes v. Aponte, 294 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.P.R. 1969).
30. See, e.g., State v. Brizendine, 445 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1969).
31. United States v.-Kaufman, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
32. Id.; cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52 (1968).
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For the post-custody petitioner, section 1983's grant of relief in suits
at law, equity, or any other proper proceeding for redress would seem
well-tailored to meet this constitutional demand.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not expressly held that any form of post-
conviction or post-custody relief must be provided on the state level.
The development through Morgan and Pollard of a federal guarantee
that release from custody will not forfeit a petitioner's right to
collateral relief from a prior unconstitutional federal conviction can
logically be argued to represent a response to the mandates of due
process. The budding development under section 1983 of a federal
remedy for the state post-custody petitioner suggests that due process
is satisfied if some form of relief is available at any level of the federal
system. It may also suggest that the federal courts would prefer to
construct a federal remedy rather than arbitrarily force inflexible
procedures into state post-conviction systems. An analysis of the
Morgan-Pollard line of decisions does reveal clearly, however, that the
Supreme Court will not tolerate a vacuum in the post-custody context
where civil disabilities are imposed on the unconstitutionally convicted.
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